Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria
Playing Markov Games Without Observing Payoffs
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Extends copycat learning from repeated symmetric matrix games to zero-sum symmetric Markov games, giving sublinear-regret, polynomial-time algorithms for three symmetry notions (SSG, MSG, HSG) when only the opponent's actions are observed.
Problem
Learning to compete in zero-sum symmetric Markov games without observing payoffs or knowing transitions, observing only the adversary's actions, against an adversary that knows the full game.
Approach
Applies the copycat strategy (equalizing counts of symmetric action pairs via a virtual zero-sum game) locally per state for per-state symmetric games; shows MSG reduces to SSG via an expected payoff redistribution transformation and HSG collapses to a single symmetric matrix game, enabling copycat-style regret bounds.
Key results
- SSG: regret O(n sqrt(T|S|H)) in poly(|S|,n,T) time, with matching Omega(n sqrt(T|S|H)) lower bound.
- MSG: reduces to SSG via expected payoff redistribution, achieving O(n sqrt(T|S|H)).
- HSG: collapses to a single matrix game with O(Hn sqrt(T)) regret.
Surprising findings
- Stronger, more holistic symmetry notions (MSG, HSG) make the problem easier, not harder; HSG collapses to a single matrix game.
- Learner can force a draw without knowing transition laws.
Limitations
- Results are purely theoretical with no experiments.
- Adversary is assumed omniscient and learner restricted to Markov policies.
- Only exact symmetry is considered; approximate symmetry is left to future work.
Experimental setup
Metrics: expected cumulative payoff regret bound O(n sqrt(T|S|H))
Builds on: copycat strategy (Feldman, Kalai, Tennenholtz 2010) Blackwell approachability online gradient descent
Closest papers by meaning
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