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Playing Markov Games Without Observing Payoffs

NeurIPS 2026 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Learning in Markov games · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Extends copycat learning from repeated symmetric matrix games to zero-sum symmetric Markov games, giving sublinear-regret, polynomial-time algorithms for three symmetry notions (SSG, MSG, HSG) when only the opponent's actions are observed.

Problem

Learning to compete in zero-sum symmetric Markov games without observing payoffs or knowing transitions, observing only the adversary's actions, against an adversary that knows the full game.

Approach

Applies the copycat strategy (equalizing counts of symmetric action pairs via a virtual zero-sum game) locally per state for per-state symmetric games; shows MSG reduces to SSG via an expected payoff redistribution transformation and HSG collapses to a single symmetric matrix game, enabling copycat-style regret bounds.

Key results

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: expected cumulative payoff regret bound O(n sqrt(T|S|H))

Builds on: copycat strategy (Feldman, Kalai, Tennenholtz 2010) Blackwell approachability online gradient descent

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