Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria
Tractable Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning through Behavioral Economics
Eric Mazumdar, Kishan Panaganti, Laixi Shi
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Introduces behavioral-economics concepts (risk aversion and bounded rationality) into MARL to make desired solution concepts such as Nash equilibria tractable to compute.
Problem
Nash equilibria and similar desired solution concepts in multi-agent reinforcement learning may be intractable to compute, blocking principled MARL algorithms.
Approach
Imbues agents with human-like risk aversion and bounded rationality from behavioral economics so that a tractable solution concept replaces intractable Nash equilibria in MARL.
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