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Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria

Foundations of Multi-Agent Learning in Dynamic Environments: Where Reinforcement Learning Meets Strategic Decision-Making

AAAI 2025 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Learning in Markov games · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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A short AAAI 2025 invited/position-style summary of the author's research on multi-agent RL theory, covering sample complexity, computational hardness, independent learning, and applications.

Problem

Understanding the statistical and computational foundations of multi-agent reinforcement learning in stochastic games, and why equilibrium is the target solution concept.

Approach

Reviews the author's prior theoretical results: near-optimal model-based sample complexity for two-player zero-sum stochastic games, PPAD-hardness of computing stationary Markov CCE in general-sum stochastic games, and an economics-inspired view of independent learning as the long-run outcome of strategic interaction.

Key results

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Builds on: Shapley stochastic games model-based RL

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