AI Paper Atlas

Research map / Large language models / Language, safety and interpretability

Jailbreak elicitation and risk

Elicit harmful outputs through interaction, many-shot, and weak-to-strong jailbreaks.

21 accepted papers at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI (2024–2026) · an approach in Language, safety and interpretability, keyword cluster “safety · jailbreak · harmful”

State History Tried Checklist Preprints Who Export

Where it stands

Not enough benchmark data Fewer than four papers report the same benchmark, so there is no record to follow.

6 papers in 2023–24 and 15 in 2025–26 (at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI); its share of the topic held steady, from 0.9% to 0.8%.

How this is decided

A benchmark is tracked when at least four papers of this approach report their own method on the same dataset and metric in at least two different years. Its record is the best number reported up to 2024 compared with the best reported in 2025–26: still improving means at least 1% better, flat means at most 0.2% better with at least two papers from 2025–26 trying. Numbers on a different scale from the rest (a fraction among percentages) and far outliers are left out. Results come from different papers with different setups, so they are signals, not head-to-head comparisons. The share of papers is counted at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI.

How it got here

2016: 0162017: 0172018: 0182019: 0192020: 0202021: 0212022: 0222023: 0232024: 6242025: 11252026: 426

Most cited paper of each year

Earliest papers here

What has been tried

16 papers here report 182 measured changes (a component added, removed or swapped, compared with a baseline): helped 60%, no clear effect 6%, hurt 27%, mixed 7%. Papers mostly publish changes that helped, so "helped" is over-represented.

Ablations in recent papers

What was changedMeasured onResultEffectPaper
swap the user and assistant tagsOpportunities to Insult · NLL of harmful responseMixedMany-shot Jailbreaking (NeurIPS 2024 · 21 citations)
Add off-topic and low-risk prunersHarmBench test set · attack performanceHelpedWildTeaming at Scale: From In-the-Wild Jailbreaks to (Adversarially) Safer Language Models (NeurIPS 2024 · 13 citations)
Add demo-level random searchAdvBench, 8-shot · rule-based ASR38% -> 100%HelpedImproved Few-Shot Jailbreaking Can Circumvent Aligned Language Models and Their Defenses (NeurIPS 2024 · 6 citations)
Constrain gibberish instead of maximizing gibberish rewardRed teaming, d_safe=-0.7 · Self-BLEU0.811 -> 0.834HelpedDiveR-CT: Diversity-enhanced Red Teaming Large Language Model Assistants with Relaxing Constraints (AAAI 2025 · 2 citations)
use a fine-tuned unsafe small model rather than the base model as the unsafe guideAdvBench · ASR (%)39.8 -> 99.4HelpedWeak-to-Strong Jailbreaking on Large Language Models (ICML 2025 · 2 citations)
Remove the default system promptSafety landscape · Visage85.32 -> 80.68; 4.64 pp dropHurtNavigating the Safety Landscape: Measuring Risks in Finetuning Large Language Models (NeurIPS 2024 · 2 citations)
automatically select perturbation hyperparameters rather than manually choosing themreported attack settings · ASR-useful2%~10%HelpedUncovering Safety Risks of Large Language Models through Concept Activation Vector (NeurIPS 2024 · 2 citations)
ablate the refusal vector extracted from EnglishPolyRefuse safety-aligned languages · compliance rateincreases from 0.57 to 0.87HurtRefusal Direction is Universal Across Safety-Aligned Languages (NeurIPS 2025 · 1 citation)
Vary the continuity weight lambdaPAIR attacks on Vicuna-13B · ASRNo clear effectProtecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck (NeurIPS 2024 · 1 citation)
Use score-ranked yes-biased instructions rather than randomly selected instructionsAdvBench · ASR (GPT-4)HelpedInvestigating the Security Threat Arising from “Yes-No” Implicit Bias in Large Language Models (AAAI 2025 · 0 citations)
Increase the number of aggregated sub-concepts from k = 2 toward k = 6Intent reconstruction across tested models · comprehension ratebelow 80%; approximately 100%HelpedCannot See the Forest for the Trees: Invoking Heuristics and Biases to Elicit Irrational Choices of LLMs (ICML 2025 · 0 citations)
Split words to induce token segmentation bias1,432 harmful responses, 8 Judge LLMs · unsafe prediction ratio (average)84.4% -> 75.5%HelpedEmoji Attack: Enhancing Jailbreak Attacks Against Judge LLM Detection (ICML 2025 · 0 citations)

What reviewers will expect

Datasets and baselines named in the 12 papers of this approach from 2025–2026 that have a full-text summary. Leaving out the common ones is a frequent review question.

Datasets

  • AdvBench · 5 of 12 papers
  • MaliciousInstruct · 2 of 12 papers
  • SORRY-Bench · 2 of 12 papers

Baselines

  • DeepInception · 3 of 12 papers
  • GCG · 3 of 12 papers
  • JailBroken · 2 of 12 papers
  • CodeChameleon · 2 of 12 papers
  • ReNeLLM · 2 of 12 papers
  • AutoDAN · 2 of 12 papers

Recent preprints

Loading recent arXiv preprints…

    Who publishes on it

    Institutions on the most papers of this approach since 2023 (of 21 papers; from OpenAlex and the papers' affiliations).

    Use it

    Download BibTeX of 20 key papersOpen the topic in the interactive map

    Get alerts. Describe your idea in scime atlas and save it (free scime account): you get a weekly email when new preprints land close to it.

    Same keyword cluster

    Elsewhere in the topic

    Benchmark numbers, ablations and baseline numbers are extracted by AI from each paper's full text and can be wrong; the paper is the authority. Data: results index of 2026-11-02, citation counts from OpenAlex (2026-10-09).

    Get the next scime Dispatch and a monthly field update

    Free. We send a confirmation link first; every email has a one-click unsubscribe. Privacy