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Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Attacks on text and graphs

Adversarial prompts for language models

Attack and defend language models with adversarial prompts and robustness benchmarks.

98 accepted papers at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI (2019–2026) · an approach in Attacks on text and graphs, keyword cluster “llms · prompt · jailbreak”

State History Benchmarks Tried Checklist Preprints Who Export

Where it stands

Leveling off Several papers from 2025–26 still report on 1 tracked benchmark, but the best result has barely moved since 2024.

17 papers in 2023–24 and 65 in 2025–26 (at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI); its share of the topic grew, from 6.1% to 13.4%.

What looks settled

How this is decided

A benchmark is tracked when at least four papers of this approach report their own method on the same dataset and metric in at least two different years. Its record is the best number reported up to 2024 compared with the best reported in 2025–26: still improving means at least 1% better, flat means at most 0.2% better with at least two papers from 2025–26 trying. Numbers on a different scale from the rest (a fraction among percentages) and far outliers are left out. Results come from different papers with different setups, so they are signals, not head-to-head comparisons. The share of papers is counted at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI.

How it got here

2016: 0162017: 0172018: 0182019: 2192020: 3202021: 7212022: 4222023: 8232024: 9242025: 28252026: 3726

Most cited paper of each year

Earliest papers here

Benchmark records

The best number each year that beat every earlier one, among papers of this approach reporting their own method. Numbers are extracted by AI from each paper's text; check the paper before citing.

MT-Bench · score (higher is better)

4 papers, 2024–2025 · flat since 2024

2024: 8
20242025
YearBest so farSet by
20248Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers (NeurIPS 2024 · 11 citations)

What has been tried

57 papers here report 659 measured changes (a component added, removed or swapped, compared with a baseline): helped 61%, no clear effect 11%, hurt 24%, mixed 5%. Papers mostly publish changes that helped, so "helped" is over-represented.

Ablations in recent papers

What was changedMeasured onResultEffectPaper
Add Realignment (RA) to IL + SCHH-A · Alignment6.59 -> 8.23HelpedTraining Socially Aligned Language Models on Simulated Social Interactions (ICLR 2024 · 16 citations)
Add few-shot attack guidance to PromptAttack-ENGLUE Avg · ASR42.54 -> 48.34HelpedAn LLM can Fool Itself: A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack (ICLR 2024 · 13 citations)
Add circuit-breaker examples that bypass refusal mechanisms6 attacks (average) · attack success rate5.8 -> 2.5HelpedImproving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers (NeurIPS 2024 · 11 citations)
Remove adversarial attacks during CAPO trainingGCG · ASR difference-2.5No clear effectEfficient Adversarial Training in LLMs with Continuous Attacks (NeurIPS 2024 · 10 citations)
remove parent-child similarity filterLlama 2-chat 7B archive · ASR (GPT-4)0.92 ± 0.01 -> 0.99 ± 0.01HelpedRainbow Teaming: Open-Ended Generation of Diverse Adversarial Prompts (NeurIPS 2024 · 7 citations)
Set top-p to 0.992 instead of 0.99All 8 deployed detectors · mean T@1%F0.0690 -> 0.0565HelpedAdversarial Paraphrasing: A Universal Attack for Humanizing AI-Generated Text (NeurIPS 2025 · 2 citations)
Remove refusal feature ablation during training (RT, p_RFA=0)HarmBench, robustness across attacks · ASRHurtRobust LLM safeguarding via refusal feature adversarial training (ICLR 2025 · 2 citations)
add training languages that use the same scriptUrdu · BLEU+100.20%HelpedAgainst All Odds: Overcoming Typology, Script, and Language Confusion in Multilingual Embedding Inversion Attacks (AAAI 2025 · 1 citation)
Remove erase lossWMDP-bio · accuracy29.7 -> 64.8HurtErasing Conceptual Knowledge from Language Models (NeurIPS 2025 · 1 citation)
Remove negative text from the CLIP attack objectiveGPT-4V targeted caption generation · Targeted cap.71% to 46%HurtDissecting Adversarial Robustness of Multimodal LM Agents (ICLR 2025 · 1 citation)
Reduce candidate positions from n=20 to n=1 (Charmer-Fast)TextAttack benchmarks · ASR (%)BERT AG-News 98.51 -> 95.86; BERT RTE 97.01 -> 89.55; BERT SST-2 100.00 -> 100.00MixedRevisiting Character-level Adversarial Attacks for Language Models (ICML 2024 · 1 citation)
Add a random generation to the affirmative seedHarmBench standard behaviors · ASR@5120.35 -> 0.36No clear effectREINFORCE Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models: An Adaptive, Distributional, and Semantic Objective (ICML 2025 · 0 citations)

What reviewers will expect

Datasets and baselines named in the 35 papers of this approach from 2025–2026 that have a full-text summary. Leaving out the common ones is a frequent review question.

Datasets

  • AdvBench · 8 of 35 papers
  • HarmBench · 6 of 35 papers
  • MMLU · 5 of 35 papers
  • Alpaca · 4 of 35 papers
  • MT-Bench · 3 of 35 papers
  • XSTest · 3 of 35 papers
  • CIFAR-10 · 2 of 35 papers
  • ImageNet · 2 of 35 papers

Baselines

  • GCG · 5 of 35 papers
  • PAIR · 4 of 35 papers
  • AutoDAN · 2 of 35 papers
  • BEAST · 2 of 35 papers
  • R2D2 · 2 of 35 papers
  • CAT · 2 of 35 papers
  • LAT · 2 of 35 papers
  • SmoothLLM · 2 of 35 papers

Recent preprints

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    Who publishes on it

    Institutions on the most papers of this approach since 2023 (of 82 papers; from OpenAlex and the papers' affiliations).

    Use it

    Download BibTeX of 34 key papersOpen the topic in the interactive map

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    Same keyword cluster

    Elsewhere in the topic

    Benchmark numbers, ablations and baseline numbers are extracted by AI from each paper's full text and can be wrong; the paper is the authority. Data: results index of 2026-11-02, citation counts from OpenAlex (2026-10-09).

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