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Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Attacks on text and graphs

LLM jailbreak and injection defense

Study jailbreaks and prompt injections and train or evaluate safer LLMs.

113 accepted papers at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI (2019–2026) · an approach in Attacks on text and graphs, keyword cluster “llms · prompt · jailbreak”

State History Tried Checklist Preprints Who Export

Where it stands

Not enough benchmark data Fewer than four papers report the same benchmark, so there is no record to follow.

8 papers in 2023–24 and 101 in 2025–26 (at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI); its share of the topic grew, from 2.9% to 20.8%.

How this is decided

A benchmark is tracked when at least four papers of this approach report their own method on the same dataset and metric in at least two different years. Its record is the best number reported up to 2024 compared with the best reported in 2025–26: still improving means at least 1% better, flat means at most 0.2% better with at least two papers from 2025–26 trying. Numbers on a different scale from the rest (a fraction among percentages) and far outliers are left out. Results come from different papers with different setups, so they are signals, not head-to-head comparisons. The share of papers is counted at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI.

How it got here

2016: 0162017: 0172018: 0182019: 1192020: 2202021: 0212022: 1222023: 3232024: 5242025: 33252026: 6826

Most cited paper of each year

Earliest papers here

What has been tried

40 papers here report 451 measured changes (a component added, removed or swapped, compared with a baseline): helped 63%, no clear effect 8%, hurt 26%, mixed 4%. Papers mostly publish changes that helped, so "helped" is over-represented.

Ablations in recent papers

What was changedMeasured onResultEffectPaper
Use the Important message phrasing instead of TODO, Ignore previous instructions, or InjecAgent promptsAgentDojo security cases · targeted ASR3.66% -> 57.7%; 5.41% -> 57.7%; 5.72% -> 57.7%HelpedAgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents (NeurIPS 2024 · 83 citations)
add the Multimodal Retriever to MBETR-OP (2,310 grounded samples) · Recall66.28 -> 73.94HelpedPhishAgent: A Robust Multimodal Agent for Phishing Webpage Detection (AAAI 2025 · 18 citations)
Add random search and self-transfer to the prompt attackAdvBench · attack success rate0% -> 100%HelpedJailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks (ICLR 2025 · 9 citations)
Increase defense control lengthAdvBench, GCG/AutoDAN/PAIR · ASRHelpedFight Back Against Jailbreaking via Prompt Adversarial Tuning (NeurIPS 2024 · 9 citations)
Add preference optimization to QEMAdvBench, Llama2 · ASR (%) ClassJudge3.06 -> 3.26HelpedJailPO: A Novel Black-Box Jailbreak Framework via Preference Optimization Against Aligned LLMs (AAAI 2025 · 4 citations)
increase the weight factor from 0.25 to 1.00 for AEO (COS)Text-to-image · NSFW rate (%)21.70 -> 95.30; 1.10 -> 77.00MixedMind the Trojan Horse: Image Prompt Adapter Enabling Scalable and Deceptive Jailbreaking (CVPR 2025 · 4 citations)
Train on all four watermarks instead of only ExpSurveyed watermarks · evasion rateat least 97.0% -> at least 96.3%HurtOptimizing Adaptive Attacks against Watermarks for Language Models (ICML 2025 · 2 citations)
Add latent Bayesian optimization (LBO) to suffix generationMistral-7B-v0.3 and Falcon-7B · ASRHelpedGASP: Efficient Black-Box Generation of Adversarial Suffixes for Jailbreaking LLMs (NeurIPS 2025 · 1 citation)
Add a scenario protection prompt to the Naive detectorFigStep · ASR28.8 -> 9.6; 36.8 -> 31.8; 26.2 -> 7.6; 35.2 -> 2.8HelpedThe VLLM Safety Paradox: Dual Ease in Jailbreak Attack and Defense (NeurIPS 2025 · 1 citation)
Evict the lowest-ranked 20% of tokens with deterministic rather than randomized selectionAutoDAN · ASRHelpedRobustKV: Defending Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks via KV Eviction (ICLR 2025 · 1 citation)
Replace the reference model with TinyLlama-1.1bAdvBench test · ASR@10 (%)10.6 -> 10.6No clear effectJailbreaking as a Reward Misspecification Problem (ICLR 2025 · 1 citation)
Remove Lp from the loss function10-20 character payloads, token space · ASR(T)37% -> 20%HurtAIA: Autoregression-Based Injection Attacks Against Text2SQL Models (AAAI 2025 · 0 citations)

What reviewers will expect

Datasets and baselines named in the 47 papers of this approach from 2025–2026 that have a full-text summary. Leaving out the common ones is a frequent review question.

Datasets

  • AdvBench · 10 of 47 papers
  • HarmBench · 5 of 47 papers
  • GSM8K · 4 of 47 papers
  • AlpacaEval · 4 of 47 papers
  • SST2 · 3 of 47 papers
  • AG News · 3 of 47 papers
  • WikiText · 3 of 47 papers
  • BeaverTails · 2 of 47 papers

Baselines

  • GCG · 10 of 47 papers
  • PAIR · 5 of 47 papers
  • AutoDAN · 4 of 47 papers
  • TAP · 4 of 47 papers
  • SmoothLLM · 3 of 47 papers
  • FigStep · 2 of 47 papers
  • SFT · 2 of 47 papers
  • RepNoise · 2 of 47 papers

Recent preprints

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    Who publishes on it

    Institutions on the most papers of this approach since 2023 (of 109 papers; from OpenAlex and the papers' affiliations).

    Use it

    Download BibTeX of 27 key papersOpen the topic in the interactive map

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    Same keyword cluster

    Elsewhere in the topic

    Benchmark numbers, ablations and baseline numbers are extracted by AI from each paper's full text and can be wrong; the paper is the authority. Data: results index of 2026-11-02, citation counts from OpenAlex (2026-10-09).

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