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Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Attacks on text and graphs

Vision-language model robustness

Attack and harden vision-language models with multimodal adversarial search and prompt tuning.

96 accepted papers at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI (2018–2026) · an approach in Attacks on text and graphs, keyword cluster “llms · prompt · jailbreak”

State History Tried Checklist Preprints Who Export

Where it stands

Not enough benchmark data Fewer than four papers report the same benchmark, so there is no record to follow.

13 papers in 2023–24 and 82 in 2025–26 (at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI); its share of the topic grew, from 4.7% to 16.9%.

How this is decided

A benchmark is tracked when at least four papers of this approach report their own method on the same dataset and metric in at least two different years. Its record is the best number reported up to 2024 compared with the best reported in 2025–26: still improving means at least 1% better, flat means at most 0.2% better with at least two papers from 2025–26 trying. Numbers on a different scale from the rest (a fraction among percentages) and far outliers are left out. Results come from different papers with different setups, so they are signals, not head-to-head comparisons. The share of papers is counted at ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, CVPR and AAAI.

How it got here

2016: 0162017: 0172018: 1182019: 0192020: 0202021: 0212022: 0222023: 2232024: 11242025: 26252026: 5626

Most cited paper of each year

Earliest papers here

What has been tried

35 papers here report 364 measured changes (a component added, removed or swapped, compared with a baseline): helped 72%, no clear effect 5%, hurt 17%, mixed 6%. Papers mostly publish changes that helped, so "helped" is over-represented.

Ablations in recent papers

What was changedMeasured onResultEffectPaper
Replace the adversarial image with unconstrained adversarial textRealToxicityPrompts challenging subset · outputs with any toxic attribute (Perspective API)34.8 -> 54.8; 34.8 -> 66.0MixedVisual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Aligned Large Language Models (AAAI 2024 · 122 citations)
Use unified rather than class-specific context with limited training data11-dataset average, 1 and 4 shots · accuracy51.3 vs 39.9 (1 shot); 58.2 vs 54.3 (4 shots), ε=1/255HelpedOne Prompt Word is Enough to Boost Adversarial Robustness for Pre-trained Vision-Language Models (CVPR 2024 · 33 citations)
Use latent projection, latent optimization, and controllable generation together14-dataset evaluation · mIoU59.1 -> 77.6HelpedASAM: Boosting Segment Anything Model with Adversarial Tuning (CVPR 2024 · 18 citations)
Add auxiliary models during fine-tuningMSCOCO image-text retrieval · R@Mean6.455%, 13.75%, and 15.875%HelpedAnyattack: Towards Large-scale Self-supervised Adversarial Attacks on Vision-language Models (CVPR 2025 · 16 citations)
Add expansion to the anchorsCIFAR-FS · Robust accuracyHelpedLanguage-Driven Anchors for Zero-Shot Adversarial Robustness (CVPR 2024 · 10 citations)
Add Gaussian noise to adversarial samples16 datasets, PGD10 · robust accuracyHelpedOn the Zero-shot Adversarial Robustness of Vision-Language Models: A Truly Zero-shot and Training-free Approach (CVPR 2025 · 8 citations)
replace marginal entropy minimization with pointwise entropy minimizationFine-grained datasets (average) · Acc.53.3 -> 53.7HelpedR-TPT: Improving Adversarial Robustness of Vision-Language Models through Test-Time Prompt Tuning (CVPR 2025 · 6 citations)
add the REO stage after STENudity removal (CCE) · ASR (%)54.73 -> 4.21HelpedSTEREO: A Two-Stage Framework for Adversarially Robust Concept Erasing from Text-to-Image Diffusion Models (CVPR 2025 · 6 citations)
Add calibration activation to the projection termPerturbation-based attacks, ε=16/255 to unconstrained · Toxicity Score (%)40.49 -> 15.52; 41.80 -> 5.45; 33.90 -> 2.39; 10.50 -> 0.07HelpedSteering Away from Harm: An Adaptive Approach to Defending Vision Language Model Against Jailbreaks (CVPR 2025 · 6 citations)
Do not reset prompts during inference rather than resetting after every sampleImageNet · robust accuracy49.92 -> 0.48HurtTAPT: Test-Time Adversarial Prompt Tuning for Robust Inference in Vision-Language Models (CVPR 2025 · 5 citations)
Increase the ℓ∞ perturbation budget from 2/255 to 4/255Specific string attack · success rate0% to 94%HelpedImage Hijacks: Adversarial Images can Control Generative Models at Runtime (ICML 2024 · 4 citations)
Generate adversarial text strategically rather than use the fixed incorrect optionVQAv2 · ASRHelpedSceneTAP: Scene-Coherent Typographic Adversarial Planner against Vision-Language Models in Real-World Environments (CVPR 2025 · 3 citations)

What reviewers will expect

Datasets and baselines named in the 32 papers of this approach from 2025–2026 that have a full-text summary. Leaving out the common ones is a frequent review question.

Datasets

  • ImageNet · 6 of 32 papers
  • MM-Vet · 4 of 32 papers
  • AdvBench · 4 of 32 papers
  • Caltech101 · 4 of 32 papers
  • DTD · 3 of 32 papers
  • EuroSAT · 3 of 32 papers
  • MM-SafetyBench · 3 of 32 papers
  • RealToxicityPrompts · 2 of 32 papers

Baselines

  • PGD · 3 of 32 papers
  • TeCoA · 3 of 32 papers
  • FigStep · 2 of 32 papers
  • JailGuard · 2 of 32 papers
  • GCG · 2 of 32 papers
  • APT · 2 of 32 papers
  • ESD · 2 of 32 papers
  • UCE · 2 of 32 papers

Recent preprints

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    Who publishes on it

    Institutions on the most papers of this approach since 2023 (of 95 papers; from OpenAlex and the papers' affiliations).

    Use it

    Download BibTeX of 23 key papersOpen the topic in the interactive map

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    Same keyword cluster

    Elsewhere in the topic

    Benchmark numbers, ablations and baseline numbers are extracted by AI from each paper's full text and can be wrong; the paper is the authority. Data: results index of 2026-11-02, citation counts from OpenAlex (2026-10-09).

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