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The Sample Complexity of Online Strategic Decision Making with Information Asymmetry and Knowledge Transportability

ICML 2025 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Strategic classification · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes an online strategic interaction model (generalized principal-agent MDP) and a model-based NPIV-based optimistic planning algorithm (OPME) that learns an epsilon-optimal policy under confounding and source-to-target knowledge transfer with Õ(1/ε²) sample complexity.

Problem

Learning an optimal principal policy in sequential principal-agent interactions where agents' private types confound rewards and transitions (information asymmetry), with online non-i.i.d. data collected from a source agent population and deployment on a different target population (knowledge transp

Approach

Use the principal's state-action pairs as instrumental variables in a nonparametric IV (NPIV) minimax estimation to identify reward and transition models despite confounding, with martingale (Freedman) concentration for non-i.i.d. online data; estimate on the source population and explore/plan under the target population via optimistic planning, with a concentrability-style knowledge-transfer term

Key results

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: sample complexity

Baselines: PLAN (offline strategic MDP)

Builds on: strategic MDP (PLAN) NPIV minimax estimation distributional Eluder dimension

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