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Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions

AAAI 2025 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Learning with strategic agents · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Designs strategyproof mechanisms that place a new pathway (edge) connecting two line-segment regions separated by an obstacle, given agents' private locations, for social and maximum cost objectives, with characterization, deterministic and randomized approximation bounds.

Problem

Choosing where to build a bypass/pathway connecting two regions separated by an obstacle when agents hold private locations and must reach the other region; objectives are social cost and maximum cost under strategyproofness.

Approach

Models the bridge-building problem as a mechanism design problem on a line with an obstacle, shows agent preferences are two-dimensional single-peaked (so strategyproof anonymous mechanisms are 2D generalized medians), gives an optimal group-strategyproof mechanism for social cost, and approximately optimal deterministic and randomized mechanisms for maximum cost.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use TwoExtreme to connect the nearest-to-obstacle extreme agentsMaximum-cost pathway construction · Maximum cost (general obstacle length L)approximation ratio: \frac{2 - 2(1 - k)L}{1 + k - (1 - k)L}Helped
Use TwoExtreme when the obstacle has zero lengthMaximum-cost pathway construction · Maximum cost (L=0)approximation ratio: \frac{2}{1 + k}Helped
Restrict the endpoints from getting too close to the obstacle (TwoExtremeRestrict) (ablation)TwoExtreme · Maximum cost (L=0)approximation ratio: \frac{2}{1+k} -> 2\cdot \max\left(\frac{1-(1-k)c}{1\!+\!k\!-(1-k)c}, \frac{k(2c-c^2)+1-c^2}{2-2c+2ck}, \frac{1+2ck}{2\!Helped
Randomize between the extreme endpoints and midpoint endpoints using the specified probabilityMaximum-cost pathway construction · Maximum cost (L=0)approximation ratio: \max\left(\frac{4-2k}{3-k}, \frac{1+k}{1+k^2}\right)Helped
Use the optimal maximum-cost solutionOptMaxCost · Maximum costoptimalityMixed
Set k=0 (ablation)OptSocCost · Social costoptimalityNo clear effect

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: approximation ratio social cost maximum cost

Baselines: TwoExtreme Median mechanism OptMaxCost

Builds on: generalized median mechanism multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences bridge-building algorithms (Cai et al.)

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