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Outbidding and Outbluffing Elite Humans: Mastering Liar’s Poker via Self-Play and Reinforcement Learning

NeurIPS 2026 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Cooperation and social dilemmas · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Trains Solly, a small MLP agent via self-play with multi-player R-NaD (actor-critic regularized Nash dynamics), that beats elite humans and LLMs (GPT-4.1, o3) at reduced-format 3x3 and 5x5 Liar's Poker.

Problem

Multi-player imperfect-information games like Liar's Poker, where all players stay engaged across bidding rounds, lack AI agents that reach elite human play; Nash equilibrium guarantees do not extend cleanly beyond two players.

Approach

Extends two-player R-NaD (used in DeepNash) to n-player self-play with a small MLP, evaluated primarily against elite human players and LLMs rather than by equilibrium computation, using best-response DQN exploiters to estimate exploitability.

Key results

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Benchmarks: 3x3 2-player Liar's Poker 3x3 3-player Liar's Poker 5x5 2-player Liar's Poker

Metrics: win rate equity (money won per 100 hands) best response score standard error

Baselines: GPT-4.1 OpenAI o3 Deterministic binomial baseline model DQN best response Elite human players

Builds on: R-NaD DeepNash OpenSpiel DQN

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