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Exact Algorithms and Lower Bounds for Forming Coalitions of Constrained Maximum Size

AAAI 2025 · Learning theory and algorithms › Sample complexity · approach: Computational thresholds in graphs and structure · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Studies coalition formation with bounded coalition size (C-Coalition Formation) in additively separable hedonic games, giving FPT algorithms for treewidth+C and vertex cover, W[1]-hardness results, and tight ETH lower bounds.

Problem

Maximizing utilitarian social welfare when partitioning agents (graph vertices) into coalitions of bounded maximum size C, in additively separable hedonic games; the problem is NP-hard even for C=3 and needs parameterized analysis.

Approach

Dynamic programming over nice tree decompositions that stores, per bag, one important C-partition per type (coloring of bag vertices plus coalition sizes), giving (tw·C)^O(tw) time; a vertex-cover algorithm with polynomial dependence on C; and matching ETH lower bounds and kernel/hardness results for the unweighted and weighted variants.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Parameterize C-Coalition Formation by treewidth+C via bottom-up DP over nice tree decomposition (running time (tw·C)^O(tw) n^O(1))Weighted C-Coalition Formation · theoretical, parameterized by treewidth and Crunning time (FPT membership)Helped
Parameterize by treedepth alone (no bound on C)C-Coalition Formation (unweighted) · theoretical, parameterized by treedepthW[1]-hardnessHurt
Parameterize by vertex cover number (polynomial dependence on C)Weighted C-Coalition Formation · theoretical, parameterized by vertex cover numberrunning time (FPT membership)Helped
Polynomial kernel parameterized by vertex cover number and CC-Coalition Formation (unweighted) · theoretical, parameterized by vc and Ckernel sizeHelped
Weights (weighted instead of unweighted edges) under vc+C parameterizationC-Coalition Formation · theoretical, parameterized by vc + Cpolynomial kernel existenceHurt

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Builds on: additively separable hedonic games max utilitarian coalition formation FPT algorithm (treewidth) general factors W[1]-hardness

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