Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria
A Bayesian Clearing Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| use Bayesian valuation priors and alternate valuation updates with price updates instead of subgradient price updates | Bayesian clearing mechanism · CATS paths, regions, arbitrary, and scheduling | clearing rate | Mixed |
| use the Bayesian clearing mechanism instead of the instance-optimized subgradient auction | CATS arbitrary · CATS arbitrary | clearing rate | Helped |
| use the Bayesian clearing mechanism instead of the SAOr subgradient auction | CATS paths, regions, arbitrary, and scheduling · CATS instances cleared by all auction types | median rounds to clearing | Helped |
| use the Bayesian clearing mechanism instead of the instance-optimized subgradient auction | CATS paths, regions, arbitrary, and scheduling · CATS instances cleared by all auction types | median rounds to clearing | Helped |
| increase the global agent's prior variance | Bayesian clearing mechanism · LLG, unbiased global-agent prior | rounds to clearing | Hurt |
| use an intermediate prior variance rather than a very low or very high variance for the biased global-agent prior | Bayesian clearing mechanism · LLG, biased global-agent prior | rounds to clearing | Helped |
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