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Cooperation Enforcement and Collusion Resistance in Repeated Public Goods Games

Kai Li, Dong Hao

AAAI 2019 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Cooperation and social dilemmas

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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
use a cooperation-enforcing strategy against one reinforcement-learning playerRepeated public goods game · 3-player repeated PGG (r=2), one learneraverage payoffImproved
use independent reinforcement learning for multiple opponents instead of committed cooperation-enforcing strategiesRepeated public goods game · 3-player repeated PGG (r=2), multiple independent learnersaverage payoffHurt
declare cooperation-enforcing strategies in advance and let learning opponents respondRepeated public goods game · 3-player repeated PGG (r=2), Stackelberg settingaverage payoffImproved
allow learning followers to coordinate as an alliance against committed cooperation-enforcing strategiesRepeated public goods game · 3-player repeated PGG (r=2), learning allianceaverage payoffImproved
use a cooperation-enforcing strategy that bounds each opponent's payoff at the mutual-cooperation payoffRepeated public goods game · Repeated PGG with r>n/2opponent payoffImproved
use a cooperation-enforcing strategy against a colluding groupRepeated public goods game · Repeated PGG where a cooperation-enforcing strategy existscolluders' average payoffHurt

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