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On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games

AAAI 2019 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Correlated equilibria in sequential games

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use ISE instead of SSE tie-breaking under resource assignment constraintsSecurity game in the motivating example · Motivating exampleutility guarantee: -\frac{2}{3} -> -0.5Helped
Evaluate the SSE strategy by its inducible utility guarantee rather than its tie-broken SSE utilitySecurity game in the motivating example · Motivating exampledefender utility: -\frac{1}{3} -> -\frac{2}{3}Hurt
Choose ISE rather than SSE when the attacker-preferred SSE target is not inducibleSecurity game in Example 2 · Example 2utility guaranteeHelped
Use ISE rather than SSERandom security-game instances · 500 instances; 200 targets, 1 resourceutility guaranteeHelped
Increase the number of schedules and targets covered per scheduleRandom security-game instances · 100 targets, 1 resourcepercentage of inducible targetsHelped
Compute ISE instead of SSE using the same algorithmic frameworkRandom security-game instances · 50–400 targets, 5 resourcescomputational costNo clear effect

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