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Taming the Curses of Multiagency in Robust Markov Games with Large State Space through Linear Function Approximation

NeurIPS 2026 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Learning in Markov games · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Develops provably sample-efficient algorithms for distributionally robust linear Markov games (TV fictitious uncertainty) in generative-model and online settings, breaking the curse of multiagency with large/infinite state spaces.

Problem

Sample-efficient learning of robust equilibria (CCE) in distributionally robust Markov games with large or infinite state spaces, where prior provable results are tabular or restricted to vanishing-minimal-value linear RMGs and suffer exponential dependence on the number of agents.

Approach

Extends independent per-agent linear function approximation to robust Markov games with TV fictitious uncertainty sets; uses a finite support set from a G-optimal design for generative sampling, and in the online setting a hybrid sampling scheme with pessimistic robust value estimates to sample from the approximate adversarial environment.

Key results

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: sample complexity regret epsilon-approximate CCE

Baselines: Robust-Q-FTRL P2MPO DR-NVI DRMG DR-CCE-LSI

Builds on: Robust-Q-FTRL linear Markov games with per-agent independent LFA fictitious uncertainty sets Glicksberg fixed point theorem

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