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Training Generalizable Collaborative Agents via Strategic Risk Aversion

NeurIPS 2026 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Cooperation and social dilemmas · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Proposes strategically risk-averse policy optimization (SRPO), an IPPO-style MARL method that trains each agent against a KL-constrained adversarial partner, to get collaborators that avoid free-riding and generalize to unseen partners.

Problem

Collaborative multi-agent learning produces policies that fail to generalize to new partners, partly because agents free-ride on partners' effort and overfit to conventions.

Approach

Uses risk-averse quantal response equilibrium (entropic risk with KL-constrained worst-case partner) as an inductive bias; implements it as an adversary-augmented policy optimization objective that adds minimal changes to PPO, and proves risk can increase shared reward and eliminate free-riding in structured games.</µcore_idea>

Key results

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: GSM8K

Benchmarks: Overcooked gridworld Tag Hanabi GSM8K

Metrics: cross-play reward joint accuracy individual accuracy

Baselines: IPPO

Builds on: IPPO PPO quantal response equilibrium risk-averse quantal response equilibrium

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