Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Cooperative multi-agent RL
Computational Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Formulates optimal dynamic mechanism design as a bilevel optimization over parameterized direct mechanisms, using a dynamic revelation principle, so the mechanism can be computed numerically rather than solved analytically.
Problem
Dynamic mechanism design for coordinating self-interested agents with privately held, time-evolving information; history dependence and dynamic incentive constraints make general analytical solutions difficult.
Approach
Uses a dynamic revelation principle to reduce the design problem to optimizing over parameterized direct mechanisms in a bilevel formulation, where the principal optimizes the mechanism and agents respond strategically (inner level).
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