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Bayesian Strategic Classification

NeurIPS 2024 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Strategic classification · 3 citations (OpenAlex)

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Studies strategic classification where agents hold a distributional prior over the deployed classifier and the learner strategically releases a truthful subset of hypotheses, giving oracle-efficient best-response algorithms and hardness/closed-form results for the learner's release problem.

Problem

Strategic classification under partial information: agents know only a prior over the deployed classifier, and the learner must decide how much (truthful) information to release to maximize accuracy after strategic manipulation.

Approach

Replace full classifier knowledge with a common prior over hypotheses; the learner releases a subset of hypotheses that contains the deployed classifier, agents best respond to the prior conditioned on that subset, and the learner optimizes the released subset (shown to be NP-hard for arbitrary priors but tractable for uniform priors).

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Release {h1, h2} rather than fully reveal {h1}Bayesian Strategic Classification · Partial vs. full information release (two-point example)accuracy: 2/3 -> 1Helped
Release {h2, h1.8} rather than fully reveal {h2}Bayesian Strategic Classification · Partial vs. full information release (threshold example)accuracy: 0.55 -> 1Helped
Use no-information release rather than full-information releaseBayesian Strategic Classification · One-dimensional threshold classificationfalse positive rateHelped
Use full-information release rather than any partial releaseBayesian Strategic Classification · One-dimensional threshold classificationfalse negative rateHelped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: expected strategic accuracy false positive rate false negative rate

Baselines: full information release

Builds on: strategic classification Bayesian persuasion calibrated Stackelberg games

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