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Extensive-Form Game Solving via Blackwell Approachability on Treeplexes

NeurIPS 2024 · Bandits and online learning › Online convex optimization and games · approach: Last-iterate convergence in games · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Introduces Blackwell approachability-based regret minimizers over treeplexes (sequence-form polytopes) via cone reformulation, yielding stepsize-invariant PTBP, O(1/T) SmoothPTBP, and AdaTBP for solving two-player zero-sum EFGs.

Problem

Solving two-player zero-sum extensive-form games via regret minimization over treeplexes; existing CFR+ variants are stepsize invariant but first-order methods with O(1/T) rates depend on stepsizes, and no Blackwell-approachability method operates on the full treeplex with state-of-the-art rates.

Approach

Run any regret minimizer over the conic hull cone(T) against losses f(x,l)=l - <x,l>a, with x_t = R_t/<R_t,a>, giving a regret minimizer over the treeplex with hyperplane forcing; instantiate with predictive OMD (PTBP, treeplex stepsize invariant), a stable variant restricted to C_>= (SmoothPTBP, O(1/T)), and AdaGrad/Adam (AdaTBP).

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
use Predictive Treeplex Blackwell+ (PTBP) instead of Smooth PTBP or AdaTBPTreeplex Blackwell framework · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshipconvergence to Nash equilibriumHelped
use Predictive CFR+ (PCFR+) instead of PTBPEFG solving with average iterates · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshipaverage-iterate convergence to Nash equilibriumHelped
use Predictive CFR+ instead of CFR+ or single-call predictive OMDEFG solving with average iterates · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshipaverage-iterate convergence to Nash equilibriumHelped
use PTBP instead of CFR+ and PCFR+EFG solving · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshipconvergence to Nash equilibriumHurt
use Smooth PTBP instead of PTBP (ablation)Treeplex Blackwell framework · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshipconvergence to Nash equilibriumHurt
use AdaTBP instead of PTBP (ablation)Treeplex Blackwell framework · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshipconvergence to Nash equilibriumHurt
use AdamTBP instead of PTBP (ablation)Treeplex Blackwell framework · some benchmark gamesconvergence to Nash equilibriumHurt
remove predictions from PTBP (use Treeplex Blackwell+) (ablation)PTBP · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshipconvergence to Nash equilibriumMixed
use PCFR+ instead of PTBPEFG solving with last iterates · Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Liar's Dice, Goofspiel, Battleshiplast-iterate convergence to Nash equilibriumMixed

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: Kuhn poker Leduc poker Liar's Dice Goofspiel Battleship

Benchmarks: Kuhn poker Leduc poker Liar's Dice Goofspiel Battleship

Metrics: exploitability (average iterate) exploitability (last iterate)

Baselines: CFR+ Predictive CFR+ predictive OMD Excessive Gap Technique Mirror Prox Optimistic OMD with single projection

Builds on: Blackwell approachability Regret Matching+ CFR predictive OMD AdaGrad

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