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The Equivalence of Dynamic and Strategic Stability under Regularized Learning in Games

NeurIPS 2023 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Zero-sum game learning dynamics · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use regularized learning with a steep regularizerFinite N-player games · Finite N-player gamesstochastic asymptotic stabilityMixed
Use regularized learning with a steep regularizerFinite N-player games · Finite N-player gamesirreducible stabilityMixed
Use projection-based updates with a quadratic regularizerRegularized learning · Closed setsiterations to convergence: finiteHelped
Use entropic regularization and logit choiceRegularized learning · Closed setsconvergence rate: exp(-const sum_{runalt=1}^{run} iter[step])Helped
Use fractional power regularizationRegularized learning · Closed setsconvergence rate: 1/(const + sum_{runalt=start}^{run} iter[step])^{2}Helped
Run regularized learning with step-size/gain parameters satisfying the stated conditionsRegularized learning · Any finite gameresilience to strategic deviations: with probability 1Helped
Rely on no-regret play alonePlayers' long-run behavior · The 4x4 symmetric 2-player examplerationalizability: -1/6Hurt

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