Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Attacks on text and graphs
Strategic Behavior in Two-sided Matching Markets with Prediction-enhanced Preference-formation
Stefania Ionescu, Yuhao Du, Kenneth Joseph, Aniko Hannak
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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| schools strategically lower outcomes for expensive students when forward-looking (beta > 2/3) | school interaction strategy · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | school expected discounted utility | Improved |
| all students are expensive type | school interaction strategy · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | incentive to attack | No clear effect |
| all students induce same negative utility with at least two students | school interaction strategy · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | incentive to attack | No clear effect |
| only one student giving negative utility, forward-looking schools | school interaction strategy · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | school utility | Improved |
| other school attacks at level l, best response is attacking at l+1/L (beta > 4/5) | school interaction strategy · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | school expected utility | Improved |
| both schools attack at maximum level versus both interacting truthfully | school interaction strategy · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | expected utility of both schools | Hurt |
| increase prediction accuracy and student trust | outcome-based prediction · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | utility from adversarial attack | Improved |
| predictions random (alpha = 0.5) or ignored (theta = 0) | outcome-based prediction · Two-school matching with random serial dictatorship | incentive to attack | No clear effect |
| allow schools to express true preferences instead of lotteries | matching mechanism · agent-based simulation with kNN predictions | incentive to attack | Mixed |
| schools interact strategically | school behavior · agent-based simulation | student welfare | Hurt |
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