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Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

Georgios Birmpas, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros Hollender, Francisco Marmolejo, Ninad Rajgopal, Alexandros Voudouris

NeurIPS 2020 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Opponent modeling and subgame solving · 11 citations (OpenAlex)

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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Allow the follower to report an arbitrary fake payoff matrixStackelberg game with a learning leader · General finite Stackelberg gamescomputability of optimal inducible utilityImproved
Require the reported payoff matrix to induce a unique SSEFollower deception · Non-max-degenerate leader payoff matricesoptimal inducible utility: additive loss of at most εMixed
Require a unique SSE rather than any SSEFollower deception · Max-degenerate leader payoff matricesstrongly inducible utility: 1 to 0Hurt
Use an arbitrary best-response correspondence instead of one induced by a payoff matrixFollower deception · General finite Stackelberg gamesinducibility criterionNo clear effect

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