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Optimal Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions with Different Patience of the Seller and the Buyer

NeurIPS 2019 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Learned auction design · 10 citations (OpenAlex)

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
replace constant Myerson pricing with optimal tau-step algorithm (tau=2..6)seller pricing · infinite game, uniform valuation, gamma_S>=gamma_Bexpected strategic revenue: up to +20%Helped
increase number of steps tau in the pricing algorithm (ablation)optimal tau-step algorithm · infinite game, uniform valuationexpected strategic revenueHelped
use big-deal algorithm instead of constant Myerson pricing when seller is less patientseller pricing · gamma_S < gamma_B (theory)expected revenueHelped
make seller discount closer to buyer discountoptimal algorithm · uniform valuationrevenue gain over constant pricingHurt

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