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Reserve Pricing in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Strategic Bidders

ICML 2020 · Bandits and online learning › Online convex optimization and games · approach: Learning for pricing and auctions · 7 citations (OpenAlex)

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Transform PRRFES by cyclically isolating one bidder per round, reinforcing penalization rounds, and eliminating bidders whose valuation intervals are dominatedRepeated second-price auctions with reserve and strategic bidders · Worst-case bidder valuations in [0, 1]strategic regret upper bound: \mathrm{SReg}(T,\mathcal{A},\mathbf{v},\!{\boldsymbol\gamma},\!{\boldsymbol\beta}) \!\le\! M(r\overline{v}\!+\!4)(\log_2Helped
Use cyclic bidder elimination to obtain one-buyer interactionsTransformation of a one-buyer RPPA algorithm to multiple bidders · Repeated second-price auctions with strategic biddersstrategic regret upper bound: O(\log\log T)Helped
Use the valuation-based stopping rule to remove bidders whose upper valuation bound is below another bidder's lower bounddivPRRFES · Repeated second-price auctions with strategic biddersdeviation regret: O(1)Helped

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