Research map / Optimization / Optimizers
Learning to bid in revenue-maximizing auctions
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Lazy second price auction · Exponential(λ=1), K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs truthful bidding: +50%; +29%; +14% | Helped |
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Eager second price auction · Exponential(λ=1), K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs truthful bidding: +73%; +37%; +19% | Helped |
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Myerson auction · Exponential(λ=1), K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs truthful bidding: +113%; +87%; +67% | Helped |
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Boosted second price · Exponential(λ=1), K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs truthful bidding: +60%; +71%; +52% | Helped |
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Lazy second price auction · Uniform, K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs truthful bidding: +72%; +36%; +20% | Helped |
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Eager second price auction · Uniform, K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs revenue-maximizing truthful bidding: +51%; +46%; +25% | Helped |
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Myerson auction · Uniform, K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs revenue-maximizing truthful bidding: +195%; +130%; +97.5% | Helped |
| Replace truthful bidding with learned strategic bidding | Boosted second price · Uniform, K=2–4 | bidder utility uplift vs revenue-maximizing truthful bidding: +200%; +40%; +37.5% | Helped |
| Use virtual-value thresholding below the current reserve value | Lazy second price auction · Continuation strategies under the theorem's assumptions | bidder utility | Helped |
| Relax the reserve-value indicator to an indicator of nonnegative virtual value | Lazy second price bidder-utility optimization · Theoretical optimization | bidder utility at the optimum | No clear effect |
Closest papers by meaning
- Reserve Pricing in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Strategic Bidders (ICML 2020 · similarity 0.90)
- Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees (NeurIPS 2019 · similarity 0.90)
- Sample Complexity of Posted Pricing for a Single Item (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.88)
- Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders (AAAI 2025 · similarity 0.87)
- Increasing Revenue in Efficient Combinatorial Auctions by Learning to Generate Artificial Competition (AAAI 2025 · similarity 0.87)
- Comparing Uniform Price and Discriminatory Multi-Unit Auctions through Regret Minimization (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.87)
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