Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Choose a maximal-rent-dissipation contest with monotonically decreasing contestant utility | Contest competition game with multiple designers · General contest competition game | contestant-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium | Helped |
| Restrict available contests to those with monotonically decreasing contestant utility and choose a maximal-rent-dissipation contest | Each contest designer · General contest competition game | dominant strategy | Helped |
| Allow Tullock contest parameters τ ≥ 2 | Tullock contests · Contest competition game | dominant strategy: τ ≥ 2 | Helped |
| Use a full-rent-dissipation contest, such as an all-pay auction | Contest designers whose strategy sets include such a contest · General contest competition game | contestant-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium | Helped |
| Use maximal-rent-dissipation contests with monotonically decreasing utility | Contest designers · Contest competition game | Pareto optimality for designers | Helped |
| Use maximal-rent-dissipation contests with monotonically decreasing utility | Contest competition game · Contestants' aggregate welfare | aggregate contestant welfare | Hurt |
| Use maximal-rent-dissipation contests with monotonically decreasing utility under unrestricted design, available APA, or the stated symmetric conditions | Contest competition game · Social welfare | total welfare | Helped |
| Use maximal-rent-dissipation contests when rewards and contest strategy sets differ | Contest competition game · Social welfare | total welfare: 3/2; 1441/961 | Mixed |
| Allow contests whose contestant utility is not monotonically decreasing | Contest competition game · Designer equilibrium and dominance | dominant strategy: 0.7812; 0.7761 | Hurt |
| Allow contestants to play asymmetric participation equilibria | Contest competition game · APA equilibrium | equilibrium: 2 contest designers; 3 contestants | Hurt |
| Introduce risk-averse contestants | Tullock contest competition game · Contestant-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium | equilibrium: τ=2 | Hurt |
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