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Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Human-AI and goal-conditioned

Robust agents learn causal world models

ICLR 2024 · Multi-agent systems and games › Human-AI and goal-conditioned · approach: Intrinsically motivated exploration · 5 citations (OpenAlex)

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Shows theoretically that an agent whose policies satisfy a regret bound across a large set of local distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal Bayesian network of the data generating process, with the approximation exact for optimal agents.

Problem

Whether agents must learn causal models of the data generating process in order to generalise (achieve low regret) under distributional shifts, or whether other inductive biases suffice.

Approach

Proves an equivalence between identifying the underlying causal Bayesian network and having regret-bounded optimal policies across mixtures of local interventions; the policy oracle over shifts reveals the causal model, so robust adaptation necessitates a causal model (a model-independent, causal good regulator-style result).

Key results

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: randomly generated causal influence diagrams (synthetic)

Metrics: error rate of learned DAG vs regret bound mean error in P(x,y) vs regret bound

Baselines: causal transportability theory causal hierarchy theorem

Builds on: causal influence diagrams transportability theory causal hierarchy theorem causal representation learning

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