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The Strange Role of Information Asymmetry in Auctions—Does More Accurate Value Estimation Benefit a Bidder?

Haifeng Xu, Ruggiero Cavallo

AAAI 2022 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Learned auction design · 3 citations (OpenAlex)

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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Give bidder 0 accurate information about the common value while making that information overtSecond-price auction · Two bidders; truncated exponential V0 and uniform C and V1bidder 0 utility: 1/2v0^2 -> 1/6v0^3Hurt
Make bidder 0 the only bidder informed about CUninformed bidder in a second-price auction · Two bidders; V0, C ~ U([0, 1])expected utility: v1^2/2Hurt
Make bidder 0 the only bidder informed about CUninformed bidder in a second-price auction · Multiple bidders; all distributions U([0, 1])expected utility: 9/16nImproved
Increase the number of uninformed biddersUninformed bidders in the asymmetric auction · Symmetric uninformed biddersequilibrium bidHurt
Reveal the auctioneer's information about C to bidder 1Second-price auction · Two bidders; V0 ~ U([0, α]), C ~ U([0, 1]), v1 = 0.8αauction revenue: 0.5 + 0.5α − 0.0107α2 -> 0.5 + 0.48αHurt
Give bidder 0 information about C in the common-value caseSecond-price auction · Vi ≡ 0, C ~ U([0, 1])revenue: 0.5 -> 0Hurt
Give bidder 0 information about CSecond-price auction · All bidder typessocial welfareHurt
Add a common-value component C to values while only bidder 0 observes its realizationUninformed bidder in a two-bidder second-price auction · Two bidders; any private value v1expected utilityHurt
Use log-concave common-value density to characterize the uninformed bidder's optimal bidTwo-bidder second-price auction · Two biddersbid optimalityImproved

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