Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
The Strange Role of Information Asymmetry in Auctions—Does More Accurate Value Estimation Benefit a Bidder?
Haifeng Xu, Ruggiero Cavallo
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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Give bidder 0 accurate information about the common value while making that information overt | Second-price auction · Two bidders; truncated exponential V0 and uniform C and V1 | bidder 0 utility: 1/2v0^2 -> 1/6v0^3 | Hurt |
| Make bidder 0 the only bidder informed about C | Uninformed bidder in a second-price auction · Two bidders; V0, C ~ U([0, 1]) | expected utility: v1^2/2 | Hurt |
| Make bidder 0 the only bidder informed about C | Uninformed bidder in a second-price auction · Multiple bidders; all distributions U([0, 1]) | expected utility: 9/16n | Improved |
| Increase the number of uninformed bidders | Uninformed bidders in the asymmetric auction · Symmetric uninformed bidders | equilibrium bid | Hurt |
| Reveal the auctioneer's information about C to bidder 1 | Second-price auction · Two bidders; V0 ~ U([0, α]), C ~ U([0, 1]), v1 = 0.8α | auction revenue: 0.5 + 0.5α − 0.0107α2 -> 0.5 + 0.48α | Hurt |
| Give bidder 0 information about C in the common-value case | Second-price auction · Vi ≡ 0, C ~ U([0, 1]) | revenue: 0.5 -> 0 | Hurt |
| Give bidder 0 information about C | Second-price auction · All bidder types | social welfare | Hurt |
| Add a common-value component C to values while only bidder 0 observes its realization | Uninformed bidder in a two-bidder second-price auction · Two bidders; any private value v1 | expected utility | Hurt |
| Use log-concave common-value density to characterize the uninformed bidder's optimal bid | Two-bidder second-price auction · Two bidders | bid optimality | Improved |
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