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Revenue Enhancement via Asymmetric Signaling in Interdependent-Value Auctions

Zhuoshu Li, Sanmay Das

AAAI 2019 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Learned auction design

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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Privately signal the common attribute to Bidder 1 and the private attribute to Bidder 2 (p2=1, q1=1, q2=0.5)Second-price interdependent-value auction · Corporate takeover model, two biddersexpected revenueImproved
Privately signal the common attribute to both bidders with asymmetric accuracy (p1=p2=1, q1=1, q2=0.5)Second-price interdependent-value auction · Corporate takeover model, two biddersexpected revenue: 0.64 -> 0.72Improved
Add signaling when both bidders are th typeSecond-price interdependent-value auction · Table 2 exampleexpected revenue: 0.8α -> 0.8αNo clear effect
Add signaling when Bidder 1 is tl and Bidder 2 is th, or both tlSecond-price interdependent-value auction · Table 2 exampleexpected revenue: 0.64 -> 0.64No clear effect
Give Bidder 1 perfect information while Bidder 2 has noisy informationBidder 1 utility · Table 2 examplebidder utilityHurt
Other public or private signal placements (cases one through eight of Table 1)Second-price interdependent-value auction · Corporate takeover modelexpected revenueHurt

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