Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Revenue Enhancement via Asymmetric Signaling in Interdependent-Value Auctions
Zhuoshu Li, Sanmay Das
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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Privately signal the common attribute to Bidder 1 and the private attribute to Bidder 2 (p2=1, q1=1, q2=0.5) | Second-price interdependent-value auction · Corporate takeover model, two bidders | expected revenue | Improved |
| Privately signal the common attribute to both bidders with asymmetric accuracy (p1=p2=1, q1=1, q2=0.5) | Second-price interdependent-value auction · Corporate takeover model, two bidders | expected revenue: 0.64 -> 0.72 | Improved |
| Add signaling when both bidders are th type | Second-price interdependent-value auction · Table 2 example | expected revenue: 0.8α -> 0.8α | No clear effect |
| Add signaling when Bidder 1 is tl and Bidder 2 is th, or both tl | Second-price interdependent-value auction · Table 2 example | expected revenue: 0.64 -> 0.64 | No clear effect |
| Give Bidder 1 perfect information while Bidder 2 has noisy information | Bidder 1 utility · Table 2 example | bidder utility | Hurt |
| Other public or private signal placements (cases one through eight of Table 1) | Second-price interdependent-value auction · Corporate takeover model | expected revenue | Hurt |
Closest papers by meaning
- The Strange Role of Information Asymmetry in Auctions—Does More Accurate Value Estimation Benefit a Bidder? (AAAI 2022 · similarity 0.88)
- Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders (AAAI 2025 · similarity 0.88)
- Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility (AAAI 2016 · similarity 0.87)
- Strategic Signaling and Free Information Disclosure in Auctions (AAAI 2017 · similarity 0.86)
- Prior-independent Dynamic Auctions for a Value-maximizing Buyer (NeurIPS 2021 · similarity 0.86)
- Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding (AAAI 2021 · similarity 0.86)
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