Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria
Single-Agent Dynamics in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Restrict utilities to one positive and one negative value with |f−(n)| ≥ f+(n) | Nash stability in ASHGs · ASHG | existence decision complexity | Hurt |
| Use appreciation-of-friends utilities | Nash stability · AFG | existence decision complexity | Hurt |
| Restrict utilities to at most one nonnegative value | Individually stable dynamics in ASHGs · ASHG | dynamics convergence | Helped |
| Restrict utilities to at most one nonpositive value | Contractually Nash stable dynamics in ASHGs · ASHG | dynamics convergence | Helped |
| Restrict utilities to at most two distinct values | Joint-majority stable dynamics in ASHGs · ASHG | dynamics convergence | Helped |
| Apply IS-, CNS-, and JMS-deviation dynamics to friend/enemy utility classes | FEGs, AFGs, and AEGs · FEGs, AFGs, and AEGs | dynamics running time | Helped |
| Use symmetric utilities | Nash-deviation dynamics · Symmetric ASHG | dynamics running time | Hurt |
| Use symmetric utilities | Individually stable dynamics · Symmetric ASHG | dynamics running time | Hurt |
| Use majority-in consent in AEGs | Majority-in stability · AEG | existence of stable partition | Hurt |
| Use majority-out consent in AEGs | Majority-out stability · AEG | existence of stable partition | Hurt |
| Start majority-in dynamics from the grand coalition in AFGs | Majority-in stability · AFG | dynamics running time: at most n rounds | Helped |
| Require separate or joint majority consent for deviations in general ASHGs | SMS and JMS stability · ASHG | existence decision complexity | Hurt |
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