Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Account for interval uncertainty in the follower's payoff model when choosing the leader strategy | Search-5 · Search-5 | leader utility | Helped |
| Increase the uncertainty interval size | robust limited-lookahead Stackelberg strategy · Kuhn and 2-card | leader utility | Hurt |
| Add some uncertainty intervals to the follower evaluation function | robust limited-lookahead Stackelberg strategy · Kuhn and 2-card | leader utility | No clear effect |
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