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A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders

Dimitris Fotakis, Kyriakos Lotidis, Chara Podimata

AAAI 2019 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Learned auction design

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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Replace standard demand queries with budget-constrained demand queriesPosted-price mechanisms for budget-constrained bidders · Combinatorial auctions with submodular or XOS bidderstruthfulnessImproved
Split bidders randomly, compute prices from one group, and sell to the other using BCDQsCompetitive Market Algorithm · Competitive markets with XOS liquid valuationsexpected liquid welfare: (1 - 2δ) · [2(β -1)-ε·(3β-1)]/[16β(β-1)] · OPTImproved
Compute posted prices from samples of the valuation distribution and use BCDQsBayesian posted-price mechanism · Bayesian combinatorial auctions with XOS liquid valuationsexpected liquid welfare: at least 1/4 E[bbv (ALG(bbv))] - εImproved
Replace standard demand queries with budget-constrained demand queriesCore posted-price mechanism · Budget-constrained combinatorial auctionstruthfulnessImproved

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