Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility
Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo
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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| relax ex-post IC to Bayesian IC | optimal revenue-maximizing mechanism · Figure 1 example (|Theta|=3, |Omega|=2) | seller revenue: 1 -> 1.2 | Improved |
| increase number of external signals |Omega| toward |Theta| in simulation | optimal Bayesian IC mechanism · random correlated distributions, |Theta|=30, rho=.1 | relative seller revenue | Improved |
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