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Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms

Fair Division with a Secretive Agent

AAAI 2019 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Fair division of indivisible goods

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use only valuations from n − 1 agents to construct rents robust to every room choice by the secretive agentRent division with bounded, continuous, strictly decreasing utilities · Rent divisionsecretive envy-free solution existenceHelped
Use quasilinear utilities and maximum-weight matching with a linear programSecretive rent division · Rent divisioncomputation timeHelped
Construct an n-bundle partition using valuations from n − 1 agentsIndivisible-goods allocation with monotone valuations · Indivisible goodssecretive EF1 allocation existenceHelped
Iteratively add each good to a universally least-valued bundle while preserving EF1 matchingsSecretive EF1 allocation · Indivisible goodscomputation timeHelped
Run moving-knife with n − 1 agents rather than requiring valuations from all n agentsCake division · Cake cuttingproportionalityHelped
Use the secretive maximin algorithm under submodular valuationsIndivisible-goods allocation · Indivisible goodsapproximate maximin fairness: 1/19-approximateHelped
Use additive rather than submodular valuationsSecretive approximate maximin allocation · Indivisible goodsapproximate maximin fairness: 1/2Helped

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