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The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities

AAAI 2024 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Fair division and coalition formation · 1 citations (OpenAlex)

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Studies the computational complexity of deciding EF, EF1 and EFX allocations for indivisible items under additive externalities, giving NP-completeness, FPT/XP and W[1]-hardness results and showing that agent/item-correlated valuations reduce to the standard no-externalities setting.

Problem

Deciding whether a fair (EF, EF1, or EFX) allocation of indivisible items exists when agents' valuations have additive externalities, i.e., agents also value items given to other agents.

Approach

Shows NP-completeness of EFX existence even with three agents or six value levels, gives FPT results parameterized by number of agents plus item types (or agents plus values), proves binary/bi-valued instances have EFX=EF1, and reduces agent/item-correlated valuations to the no-externality setting.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Allow additive externalities in the allocation modelEFX existence decision · General valuations; three agents; no weak-chorescomputational complexityHurt
Restrict valuations to six values and three item typesEFX existence decision · General valuations; no weak-chorescomputational complexityHurt
Bound both the number of item types and the number of agentsEF, EF1, and EFX existence decision · Additive externalitiescomputational complexityHelped
Bound both the number of different values and the number of agentsEF, EF1, and EFX existence decision · Additive externalitiescomputational complexityHelped
Parameterize by the number of itemsEF existence decision · Binary valuations; no chorescomputational complexityHurt
Use binary valuations with three agents and no weak-choresEFX existence · Three agents; no weak-choresexistence and algorithmHelped
Replace each agent's two possible valuation values with binary valuesEF, EF1, and EFX allocations · Instances where each agent has at most two valuesfairness equivalenceNo clear effect
Use binary valuations instead of general valuationsEFX versus EF1 · Fair division with externalitiesfairness equivalenceNo clear effect
Use agent-item-correlated valuationsEF, EF1, and EFX allocations · Instances with externalitiesfairness equivalenceNo clear effect
Use team-based valuationsEF1 existence · Fair division with externalitiesexistence and algorithmHelped
Use network-based valuationsEF1 existence · Fair division with externalitiesexistence and algorithmHelped
Maximize Nash social welfareNash-social-welfare-maximizing allocation · Fair division with externalitiesEFX fairnessHurt

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Builds on: EF1 EFX Equal-Cardinality-Partition Min Bisection Multicolored Clique

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