Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Learning-Augmented Coordination Mechanisms
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Studies learning-augmented coordination mechanisms for congestion games, using untrusted predictions to improve equilibrium inefficiency (PoA/PoS) bounds.
Problem
Decentralized resource allocation in congestion games is inefficient at equilibrium, measured by Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability; classical worst-case bounds can be poor, motivating use of predictions to improve coordination mechanisms.
Approach
Augments coordination mechanisms for atomic and non-atomic congestion games with learned predictions, aiming to mitigate the worst-case inefficiency of equilibria while retaining robustness to prediction error.
Experimental setup
Metrics: price of anarchy price of stability
Closest papers by meaning
- Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.89)
- The Complexity of Optimizing Atomic Congestion (AAAI 2024 · similarity 0.87)
- A Unified Framework for Uniform-Price Resource Allocation Mechanisms (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.87)
- Decentralized Noncooperative Games with Coupled Decision-Dependent Distributions (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.87)
- Impact of Decentralized Learning on Player Utilities in Stackelberg Games (ICML 2024 · similarity 0.87)
- No Coin Left Behind: Maximizing Strategic Surplus Against No-Regret Dynamics (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.86)
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