Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / LLM agents
Financial fraud collusion among generative AI agents in social networks
Qibing Ren, Zhijie Zheng, Jiaxuan Guo, Junchi Yan, Lizhuang Ma, Jing Shao
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Investigates collective financial fraud among LLM agents in large-scale social network simulations and introduces MultiAgentFraudBench to study how fraud collusion arises and succeeds.
Problem
Risks of collective financial fraud carried out by collaborating LLM agents in large-scale multi-agent systems, including whether agents can collude, how risks amplify, and which factors determine fraud success.
Approach
Frames financial fraud as a multi-agent collusion problem in social networks and provides a large-scale simulation benchmark (MultiAgentFraudBench) to measure fraud success and the factors driving it.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| enable private collusion channels among malicious agents (ablation) | DeepSeek-R1 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rpop (%): 17.0 -> 41.0 | Improved |
| enable private collusion channels among malicious agents (ablation) | DeepSeek-R1 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rconv (%): 35.0 -> 60.2 | Improved |
| use a stronger benign model (ablation) | benign agents · MAFF-Bench (malicious DeepSeek-V3) | Rpop (%): 11.0 -> 4.0 -> 1.0 | Hurt |
| increase interaction depth from 5 to 40 rounds (ablation) | DeepSeek-R1 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rconv (%): 10.8 -> 60.2 | Improved |
| lower malicious ratio from 1:10 to 1:50 (ablation) | DeepSeek-V3 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rpop (%): 12.0 -> 1.4 | Hurt |
| scale population 10x (10+100 to 100+1000) (ablation) | DeepSeek-V3 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rpop (%): 13.0 -> 18.0 vs 7.4 -> 16.5 (step 50 -> 100) | No clear effect |
| add content-level debunking warnings | DeepSeek-V3 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rpop (%): 15.0 -> 10.0 | Improved |
| add content-level debunking warnings | DeepSeek-V3 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rconv (%): 45.8 -> 50.0 | Hurt |
| add content-level debunking warnings | Claude-3.7-Sonnet w/o thinking · MAFF-Bench | Rconv (%): 52.9 -> 46.2 | Improved |
| add LLM monitor that bans suspicious agents | DeepSeek-V3 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rpop (%): 15.0 -> 3.0 | Improved |
| add LLM monitor that bans suspicious agents | Claude-3.7-Sonnet w/o thinking · MAFF-Bench | Rpop (%): 10.0 -> 2.0 | Improved |
| encourage benign agents to share fraud information (full participation) | DeepSeek-V3 malicious agents · MAFF-Bench | Rpop (%): 15.0 -> 2.0 | Improved |
Experimental setup
Benchmarks: MultiAgentFraudBench
Metrics: fraud success
Closest papers by meaning
- Secret Collusion among AI Agents: Multi-Agent Deception via Steganography (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.86)
- DeceptionBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for AI Deception Behaviors in Real-world Scenarios (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.85)
- PROBE: Learning to Audit Policy Compliance in Tool-Using LLM Agents (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.84)
- Colosseum: Auditing Collusion in Cooperative Multi-Agent Systems (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.84)
- TwinMarket: A Scalable Behavioral and Social Simulation for Financial Markets (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.84)
- Among Us: A Sandbox for Measuring and Detecting Agentic Deception (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.83)
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