atlas

Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Certified and empirical robustness

Robust Satisficing Gaussian Process Bandits Under Adversarial Attacks

NeurIPS 2025 · Adversarial robustness and security › Certified and empirical robustness · approach: Provable robust learning guarantees · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

Read the paperCheck your idea against 108,967 papers

AI-extracted summary. Written by AI from the paper's full text. Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Proposes robust satisficing acquisition algorithms (AdveRS-1, AdveRS-2, and a p-parameterized AdveRS-G) for GP bandit optimization under unknown adversarial input perturbations, with regret bounds and experiments against STABLEOPT.

Problem

Gaussian process bandit optimization where an adversary perturbs the chosen action by an unknown, possibly varying budget; the goal is to consistently achieve a satisficing threshold tau rather than maximize worst-case reward.

Approach

Replace robust optimization's ambiguity set with robust satisficing objectives (fragility-based RS-1, critical-radius-based RS-2, and a unifying p-fragility RS-G), each turned into a GP-UCB-style optimistic acquisition rule so no perturbation budget must be specified.

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Use AdveRS-2 instead of STABLEOPT with a misspecified ambiguity radiusSynthetic experiment, ε_t = 0.5 · Synthetic experiment (Assumption holds)lenient regretHelped
Use AdveRS-1 instead of STABLEOPT with a misspecified ambiguity radiusSynthetic experiment, ε_t = 0.5 · Synthetic experiment (Assumption holds)lenient regretHelped
Use RS-G with p = 2 (ablation)Synthetic experiment · Synthetic experimentlenient regretHelped
Use AdveRS algorithms instead of STABLEOPT with a misspecified ambiguity radiusAdveRS-1 and AdveRS-2 · Insulin dosageregretHelped
Set the ambiguity radius to the perturbation standard deviationSTABLEOPT · Insulin dosageregretHelped
Use RS-1 or RS-2 actions instead of the RO baselineRobustness to worst case attack · Worst-case attack robustnessArea(ε)Helped
Use RS-2 rather than RS-1Robustness to worst case attack · Worst-case attack robustnessthreshold achievementHelped
Use RS-1 rather than RS-2 when τ is unattainableRobustness to worst case attack · Worst-case attack robustnessrobustnessHelped
Use AdveRS-1 or AdveRS-2 instead of STABLEOPTSynthetic experiment · Synthetic experiment (Assumption fails)lenient regretNo clear effect
Use AdveRS-1 or AdveRS-2 instead of STABLEOPT with a correctly specified ambiguity radiusSynthetic experiment · Synthetic experiment, robust satisficing regretrobust satisficing regretHelped
Use AdveRS-1 or AdveRS-2 instead of STABLEOPTInsulin dosage · Insulin dosageregretMixed

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Datasets: UVA/PADOVA T1DM simulator

Benchmarks: synthetic proof-of-concept function insulin dosage (UVA/PADOVA T1DM simulator) inverted pendulum

Metrics: lenient regret robust satisficing regret area under worst-case reward curve

Baselines: StableOpt

Builds on: GP-UCB StableOpt robust satisficing fragility formulation

Closest papers by meaning

Writing a paper in this area? scime draft is a free LaTeX editor with AI included, real-time co-authors and a check of your references and venue rules before you submit. It also imports OpenAI Prism projects.

Open scime draft

Get the next scime Dispatch and a monthly field update

Free. We send a confirmation link first; every email has a one-click unsubscribe. Privacy