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Honor Among Bandits: No-Regret Learning for Online Fair Division
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Casts online fair division of indivisible goods with unknown player value means as a bandit problem and gives an explore-then-commit algorithm with Õ(T^{2/3}) regret that keeps envy-freeness or proportionality in expectation, plus a matching lower bound.
Problem
Online allocation of indivisible goods of finite types to players whose value means are unknown must maximize social welfare while satisfying envy-freeness or proportionality in expectation at every step.
Approach
Reduces fair online allocation with unknown values to a constrained bandit with one arm per (player, item type); shows fairness constraints satisfy structural properties (equal-treatment satisfaction, slack-or-equal-treatment via a combinatorial construction, Lipschitz and fixed support) that allow explore-then-commit with an LP over a confidence region to achieve T^{2/3} regret.
Key results
- Explore-then-commit algorithm achieves Õ(T^{2/3}) regret while maintaining envy-freeness in expectation or proportionality in expectation with probability 1-1/T.
- Lower bound of Ω̃(T^{2/3}) regret shows the upper bound is tight up to log factors for both fairness notions.
- Any algorithm satisfying envy-freeness in expectation has realized envy at most √T log T w.h.p., while no algorithm can guarantee realized envy below √T with constant probability when values are unknown.
Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use Fair Explore-Then-Commit with a UAR warm-up and robust LP commitment | Online fair division · Envy-freeness in expectation | regret: \tilde{O}(T^{2/3}) | Helped |
| Use Fair Explore-Then-Commit with a UAR warm-up and robust LP commitment | Online fair division · Proportionality in expectation | regret: \tilde{O}(T^{2/3}) | Helped |
Surprising findings
- Envy-freeness in expectation at every time step incurs no social welfare loss compared with requiring it only at the end of T rounds.
- Under unknown values, the uniform-at-random allocation is the only fair allocation for some instances, so zero-regret-type fairness cannot be obtained with o(T) regret if means can approach zero.
Limitations
- Envy-freeness regret bound has a constant that is exponential in the number of players n.
- The LP has infinitely many constraints (semi-infinite program), so the algorithm is computationally non-trivial in practice.
- Does not achieve Õ(√T) regret; UCB-style methods fail because fairness constraints are tight at the optimum.
Experimental setup
Metrics: regret social welfare realized envy
Baselines: uniform at random allocation optimal fair allocation with known means
Builds on: explore-then-commit stochastic multi-armed bandits linear bandits with safety constraints
Closest papers by meaning
- Improved Regret Bounds for Online Fair Division with Bandit Learning (AAAI 2025 · similarity 0.95)
- Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copies (ICML 2026 · similarity 0.92)
- My Fair Bandit: Distributed Learning of Max-Min Fairness with Multi-player Bandits (ICML 2020 · similarity 0.92)
- Nash Social Welfare for Multi Armed Bandits: Trajectory-wise Expected and High Probability Regret (NeurIPS 2026 · similarity 0.89)
- Greedy-Based Online Fair Allocation with Adversarial Input: Enabling Best-of-Many-Worlds Guarantees (AAAI 2024 · similarity 0.89)
- No-Regret Learning for Fair Multi-Agent Social Welfare Optimization (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.88)
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