AI Paper Atlas

Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Backdoor and poisoning

Breaking the False Sense of Security in Backdoor Defense through Re-Activation Attack

Mingli Zhu, Siyuan Liang, Baoyuan Wu

NeurIPS 2024 · Adversarial robustness and security › Backdoor and poisoning · approach: Training-time backdoor defense · 3 citations (OpenAlex)

Read the paperCheck your idea against 137,217 papers

AI-extracted summary. Written by AI from the paper's full text. Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Re-investigates backdoored models after defenses and shows that supposedly eliminated backdoors can be re-activated by a small amount of fine-tuning, with a re-activation attack exposing the false sense of security in backdoor defenses.

Problem

Existing backdoor defenses reduce attack success rates, but it is unclear whether the backdoor is truly eliminated from the model; the paper asks whether defended models remain vulnerable to reactivation of the backdoor.

Approach

The paper shows that backdoor defenses mainly suppress rather than remove backdoor features, so a backdoor can be re-activated quickly by fine-tuning the defended model on a small set of poisoned-looking data, and it proposes a re-activation attack framework to evaluate defenses accordingly.

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: attack success rate

Baselines: fine-pruning neural attention distillation anti-backdoor learning i-BAU backdoor-safe fine-tuning

Builds on: BadNets Blended attack

Closest papers by meaning

Writing a paper in this area? scime draft is a free LaTeX editor with AI included, real-time co-authors and a check of your references and venue rules before you submit. It also imports OpenAI Prism projects.

Open scime draft

Get the next scime Dispatch and a monthly field update

Free. We send a confirmation link first; every email has a one-click unsubscribe. Privacy