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Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions

Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas

NeurIPS 2022 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Learned auction design · 2 citations (OpenAlex)

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AI-extracted. The measured effects below were read by AI from the paper's full text (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
use bang-per-buck greedy allocation with Myerson payments instead of VCGrich ads auction · Rich ads, real search-engine datarunning time (msec): 0.0308 -> 0.0033Improved
use bang-per-buck greedy allocation with Myerson payments instead of VCGrich ads auction · Rich ads, real search-engine datapayment relative to VCG: 1.0 -> 0.66Hurt
use greedy-by-value instead of greedy-by-bang-per-buckMyerson-payment mechanism · Rich ads, real search-engine dataApproxECPM: 0.9493 -> 0.9196Hurt
randomize between bang-per-buck greedy and max-value adMyerson-payment mechanism · Rich ads, real search-engine dataApproxPayment: 0.66 -> 0.7758Improved

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