Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms
Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add reserve prices and boosts instead of using reserves alone | VCG · Semi-synthetic auctions, γ = 0.3, after convergence | welfare lift: 37.4% ± 3.2% -> 55.4% ± 3.3% | Helped |
| Add reserve prices and boosts instead of using reserves alone | VCG · Semi-synthetic auctions, γ = 0.3, after convergence | revenue lift: 28.2% ± 1.7% -> 44.9% ± 1.9% | Helped |
| Use reserve prices rather than boosts alone | VCG · Semi-synthetic auctions, γ = 0.3, after convergence | welfare lift: 23.0% ± 3.4% -> 37.4% ± 3.2% | Helped |
| Use reserve prices rather than boosts alone | VCG · Semi-synthetic auctions, γ = 0.3, after convergence | revenue lift: 23.7% ± 2.2% -> 28.2% ± 1.7% | Helped |
| Increase signal accuracy from γ = 0.3 to γ = 0.7 | VCG with reserve, boost, or both · Semi-synthetic auctions, after convergence | welfare lift: 37.4% ± 3.2% -> 58.6% ± 3.3%; 23.0% ± 3.4% -> 47.7% ± 3.2%; 55.4% ± 3.3% -> 67.6% ± 3.2% | Helped |
| Increase signal accuracy from γ = 0.3 to γ = 0.7 | VCG with reserve, boost, or both · Semi-synthetic auctions, after convergence | revenue lift: 28.2% ± 1.7% -> 54.1% ± 1.8%; 23.7% ± 2.2% -> 51.2% ± 3.0%; 44.9% ± 1.9% -> 59.9% ± 2.2% | Helped |
| Add reserve prices | VCG with value-maximizing bidders · Before bidders respond | welfare | No clear effect |
| Add boosts | VCG with value-maximizing bidders · Before bidders respond | welfare | Helped |
| Allow value maximizers to respond to reserve prices | VCG with reserve prices · During bidder response | welfare | Helped |
| Allow value maximizers to respond to boosts | VCG with boosts · During bidder response | welfare | Hurt |
| Use reserve prices and boosts together instead of either component alone | VCG · Semi-synthetic auctions, after convergence | welfare and revenue | Helped |
| Use reserve prices and boosts | VCG · Undominated bids with γ-approximate value signals | social welfare approximation: 1/(2-γ) -> (1+γ)/2 | Helped |
Closest papers by meaning
- Reserve Price Optimization for First Price Auctions in Display Advertising (ICML 2021 · similarity 0.91)
- Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising (AAAI 2023 · similarity 0.90)
- No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price Auctions (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.89)
- Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing (ICML 2021 · similarity 0.89)
- Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders (AAAI 2025 · similarity 0.88)
- Maximizing the Success Probability of Policy Allocations in Online Systems (AAAI 2024 · similarity 0.87)
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