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Learning to Stop: Deep Learning for Mean Field Optimal Stopping

ICML 2025 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Learning with strategic agents · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

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Formulates discrete-time, finite-space mean-field optimal stopping (MFOS), proves a dynamic programming principle and O(1/sqrt N) approximation to the N-agent problem, and proposes two neural methods (Direct Approach and DP backward induction) evaluated on six environments.

Problem

Multi-agent optimal stopping becomes computationally prohibitive as the number of agents grows; no mean-field or computational methods existed for discrete-time, finite-space mean-field optimal stopping.

Approach

Extend optimal stopping to a mean-field control setting with randomized stopping times and an extended "alive" state, prove a DPP for the mean-field problem, and learn state- and distribution-dependent stopping probabilities either by directly minimizing the social cost through trajectories (DA) or by backward induction using the DPP (DP).

Key results

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Allow randomized stopping instead of restricting the policy to the non-randomized MF strategyN-agent optimal stopping in the Randomized is better example · Randomized is better examplesocial cost: 4 -> 2Helped
Use asynchronous rather than synchronous stopping timesDA · Example 3: Crowd Motion with Congestionsocial costHelped
Use DA rather than DPMFOS neural-network training · MFOS experimentstraining speedHelped
Use DP rather than DAMFOS neural-network training · MFOS problems with long time horizonmemory requirementHelped

Surprising findings

Limitations

Experimental setup

Metrics: social cost L2 distance of empirical to mean-field distribution optimality gap between N-agent and mean-field cost

Builds on: mean-field control theory dynamic programming principle least-square Monte Carlo

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