Research map / Bandits and online learning / Online convex optimization and games
Coordinated Dynamic Bidding in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Budgets
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coordinate bids with Hybrid Coordinated Pacing (HP) instead of independent pacing (IP) | Coalition bidding · iPinYou Season 2 testing data | coalition welfare | Helped |
| Coordinate bids with Hybrid Coordinated Pacing (HP) instead of independent pacing (IP) | Coalition bidding · iPinYou Season 2 testing data | bidder utility | Helped |
| Coordinate bids with Coordinated Pacing (CP) instead of independent pacing (IP) | Coalition bidding · iPinYou Season 2 testing data | coalition welfare | Helped |
| Coordinate bids with Coordinated Pacing (CP) instead of independent pacing (IP) | Coalition bidding · iPinYou Season 2 testing data | bidder utility | Mixed |
| Coordinate bids with HP instead of IP | Coalition bidding · Synthetic asymmetric distributions | coalition welfare | Helped |
| Coordinate bids with HP instead of IP | Coalition bidding · Synthetic asymmetric distributions | bidder utility | Helped |
| Coordinate bids with CP instead of IP | Coalition bidding · Synthetic asymmetric distributions | bidder utility | Mixed |
| Use CP instead of IP | Bidder 2 in the asymmetric example · Asymmetric example with two coalition bidders and zero outside bid | utility | Hurt |
| Increase coalition size | HP and CP · iPinYou Season 2 testing data | utility improvement over IP | Hurt |
| Use CP and HP instead of IP | Coalition bidding · Synthetic symmetric distributions | coalition welfare | No clear effect |
Closest papers by meaning
- Learning to Bid in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Budgets (ICML 2023 · similarity 0.93)
- On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders (ICML 2026 · similarity 0.92)
- Dynamic Budget Throttling in Repeated Second-Price Auctions (AAAI 2024 · similarity 0.90)
- No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price Auctions (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.88)
- Optimizing the coalition gain in Online Auctions with Greedy Structured Bandits (NeurIPS 2024 · similarity 0.88)
- Learning-Augmented Online Bidding in Stochastic Settings (NeurIPS 2025 · similarity 0.87)
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