atlas

Research map / Learning theory and algorithms / Submodular and game algorithms

Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Valuations from Samples

ICML 2021 · Learning theory and algorithms › Submodular and game algorithms · approach: Learned auction design · 0 citations (OpenAlex)

Read the paperCheck your idea against 108,967 papers

AI-extracted summary. Written by AI from the paper's title only (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Lower bound on samples needed vs. upper bound: sample complexity gap of factor η^-2 max{ln(Kδ^-1), K}Crémer-McLean auction learning · theorysample complexityMixed
Lower correlation strength alpha (weaker correlation)Crémer-McLean auction learning · theorysample complexityHurt
Smaller smallest marginal probability eta of any typeCrémer-McLean auction learning · theorysample complexityHurt
Larger number of valuation types KCrémer-McLean auction learning · theorysample complexityHurt
Multi-bidder sample complexity independent of joint type space size K^n (via learning per-bidder conditional utilities)n-bidder Crémer-McLean auction · theorysample complexityHelped

Closest papers by meaning

Writing a paper in this area? scime draft is a free LaTeX editor with AI included, real-time co-authors and a check of your references and venue rules before you submit. It also imports OpenAI Prism projects.

Open scime draft

Get the next scime Dispatch and a monthly field update

Free. We send a confirmation link first; every email has a one-click unsubscribe. Privacy