Research map / Bandits and online learning / Online convex optimization and games
Robust Pricing in Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mix the revenue-robust bank account mechanism with a random posted-price auction with probability λ | Robust dynamic mechanism · Theory: revenue vs clairvoyant optimum | revenue loss bound | Mixed |
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