Research map / Bandits and online learning / Online convex optimization and games
Bisection-Based Pricing for Repeated Contextual Auctions against Strategic Buyer
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bisection-based deterministic pricing with penalization after both acceptance and rejection, and dynamically increasing penalization rate | repeated contextual posted-price auctions vs strategic buyer · worst-case strategic regret | strategic regret upper bound | Helped |
| Penalization applied after acceptance as well as rejection (versus only after rejection in non-contextual prior work) | bisection-based pricing algorithm · theoretical analysis | regret bound | No clear effect |
Closest papers by meaning
- Optimal Non-parametric Learning in Repeated Contextual Auctions with Strategic Buyer (ICML 2020 · similarity 0.92)
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