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Research map / Adversarial robustness and security / Attacks on text and graphs

Defending Against Physically Realizable Attacks on Image Classification

ICLR 2020 · Adversarial robustness and security › Attacks on text and graphs · approach: Physical adversarial patches and camouflage · 12 citations (OpenAlex)

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Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
Train with rectangular occlusion attacks instead of whole-image Lp perturbationsImage classifiers on face recognition and traffic sign tasks · Physically realizable attacksaccuracy: over 90%Helped
Use gradient-based rather than exhaustive location search (ablation)DOA · LISA stop-sign attack (10^3 iterations)accuracy: 90.5% -> 84%Hurt
Use gradient-based rather than exhaustive location search (ablation)DOA · Face eyeglass-frame attackaccuracyHurt
Change rectangle dimensions while keeping area roughly constant (ablation)DOA · Face eyeglass-frame attackaccuracyNo clear effect
Use a square 7 × 7 rectangle rather than a 10 × 5 rectangle (ablation)DOA · LISA stop-sign attackaccuracyHelped
Increase the number of PGD iterations inside the rectangle from 7 to 20 (ablation)DOA with exhaustive search and 10 × 5 rectangle · LISA stop-sign attack (10^2 iterations)accuracy: 70.5% -> 85%Helped
Increase PGD iterations inside the rectangle from 20 to 50 (ablation)DOA with exhaustive search and 10 × 5 rectangle · LISA stop-sign attack (10^2 iterations)accuracy: 85% -> 76.5%Hurt
Use conventional adversarial training or randomized smoothing rather than ROA adversarial trainingImage classifiers · Physical eyeglass-frame and sticker attacksaccuracyHurt
Increase the physical adversarial-patch regionFace recognition classifiers · Adversarial patch attackaccuracy: 20%Mixed
Train with curriculum adversarial training at ε = 32 (ablation)Traffic sign classifier · Clean traffic-sign dataaccuracy: 65.63%Hurt
Train with curriculum adversarial training at ε = 32 (ablation)Face recognition classifier · Clean face dataaccuracy: 80.85%Hurt
Use more PGD iterations for conventional adversarial training (ablation)Face and traffic-sign classifiers · Physical attacksaccuracyNo clear effect

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