Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria
Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation
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Measured effects reported in the paper
| What was changed | Where | Measured | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use the minimal extending set rather than a weakly resolute tournament solution | Tournament-solution SCFs · Pessimistic preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | Helped |
| Coarsen ME while retaining Condorcet consistency | Minimal extending set · Pessimistic preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | No clear effect |
| Use the Banks set | Condorcet extensions · Pessimistic preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | Helped |
| Use a Kelly-strategyproof Condorcet-consistent rule | Condorcet extensions · Pessimistic preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | Helped |
| Use a weakly resolute tournament solution | Tournament-solution SCFs · All preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | Hurt |
| Use Copeland | Tournament-solution SCFs · All preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | Hurt |
| Use Slater | Tournament-solution SCFs · All preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | Hurt |
| Require a tournament-solution SCF to be robust under every preference extension | Tournament-solution SCFs · All preference extensions | robust Condorcet extension | Hurt |
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