AI Paper Atlas

Research map / Multi-agent systems and games / Games and equilibria

Quantitative Extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Strategic Agents

AAAI 2016 · Multi-agent systems and games › Games and equilibria · approach: Fair division and coalition formation · 2 citations (OpenAlex)

Read the paperCheck your idea against 108,967 papers

AI-extracted summary. Written by AI from the paper's title only (no summary yet). Numbers and claims can be wrong or missing context, so check the paper before you cite or build on it.

Measured effects reported in the paper

What was changedWhereMeasuredEffect
plurality has lower price of stability than the random-dictatorship mixtureplurality · common interest Bayesian voting game, n to infinityBayesian price of stabilityHelped
MAP estimators have lower price of stabilityMAP · common interest Bayesian voting game, n to infinityBayesian price of stability: PoS 1Helped
random-dictatorship plus uniform mixture has lower price of anarchyrRD + rUni · common interest Bayesian voting game, n to infinityBayesian price of anarchyHelped
plurality under strategic play, weak BNEplurality · common interest Bayesian voting game, n to infinityBayesian price of anarchyHurt
plurality under strict BNE with even mplurality · common interest Bayesian voting game, n to infinityBayesian price of anarchyHurt
require anonymity, neutrality and strategy-proofnessmechanism class · distance-based modelsbest-case truth-revealing powerHurt

Closest papers by meaning

Writing a paper in this area? scime draft is a free LaTeX editor with AI included, real-time co-authors and a check of your references and venue rules before you submit. It also imports OpenAI Prism projects.

Open scime draft

Get the next scime Dispatch and a monthly field update

Free. We send a confirmation link first; every email has a one-click unsubscribe. Privacy